Below is my latest external piece, published at PostGlobal, a website run by WashingtonPost.com and Newsweek.com.
The published version contains edits (not by PostGlobal) I did not approve and does not include a major correction I submitted. Below is a more accurate version, which contains my approved edits and requested correction.
Recasting the U.S.-Pakistan Partnership
By Arif Rafiq
The need for the United States to redefine its relationship with Pakistan—a nuclear-armed, frontline state in the war on terror—has never been greater before. Now there is considerable opportunity to do so.
U.S. Senate Democrats issued a letter to George Bush this month urging him to “embark on a new relationship with Pakistan based on cooperation with institutions rather than individuals, and to support the will of the Pakistani people as expressed in the February 18 parliamentary elections.”
Historically, ties between the United States and Pakistan have been strongest with a Republican in the White House and an army general in power in Islamabad. In this scenario, Congress generally plays an antagonistic, if not wholly hostile role. The goodwill usually ends when Democrats in Washington and democrats in Islamabad govern. This has been the story of the on-again, off-again U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
The cycle could be broken in this period of transition with Democratic support for the new civilian government in Islamabad. But the lame duck administration in Washington must also follow suit.
In the Bush administration’s remaining months, it could do irreparable harm to our relationship with Pakistan, where democracy and nationalism have renewed. In a democratic Pakistan, decision-making will be less centralized and more representative of public opinion. But the Bush administration is increasingly acting unilaterally in Pakistan’s tribal areas and has aggressively tried to ensure a pliant government in Islamabad.
And so, amidst the opportunity for U.S.-Pakistan ties to grow also lies the seeds for their unraveling. Long-term, bilateral cooperation is in the interest of both countries, and needs to be secured. This requires recasting the U.S.-Pakistan partnership as one between sovereign democracies.
Toward this end, here are four recommendations for Washington policymakers:
1) Don’t interfere in Pakistan’s internal politics.
Washington has tried to assemble a coalition government to its liking, excluding Pakistan’s second largest party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Such an approach has backfired, rewarding those who are seen as standing up to the United States. If Washington continues to overplay its hand, it can find such parties in power and itself, partnerless in Islamabad.
2) Engage the Pakistani people.
The United States, however, should make its voice heard in Pakistan. There is plenty of opportunity to do so. US officials visit Pakistan on an almost weekly basis, but rarely speak to the local media. American generals and diplomats appear on the pan-Arab Al Jazeera regularly, but their Pakistan outreach is scant. There’s no excuse for avoiding Pakistan’s news outlets, two of which are exclusively English-language.
Instead of making their case to the Pakistani people, U.S. officials prefer dealing with their Pakistani counterparts behind closed doors. As a result, Pakistanis see the United States not as a friend, but a bully. And the good that Washington does in Pakistan, such as providing Fulbright grants and funding civil society groups, goes vastly underappreciated.
3) Provide a sizable democracy dividend.
Pakistan’s two previous democratic periods were met with massive reductions in U.S. aid, facilitating their demise in a perpetually cash-strapped Pakistan. This time around, the United States should maintain military aid and follow Senator Joseph Biden’s proposal to triple non-military assistance to $1.5 billion.
Pakistan, though deeply impoverished, is an emerging market. Yet, its recent economic surge has produced few jobs. Washington’s help would be most effective in educational and infrastructural development. And it should actively consider a free trade agreement. Pakistan’s major industries, agriculture and textiles, are in a state of crisis. Eliminating trade barriers will make Pakistani exports more competitive, spur job growth, and easily win Pakistani hearts.
4) Forge a comprehensive Pakistan-Afghanistan policy.
Unilateralism and military force cannot defeat the insurgencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But a comprehensive, regional solution can. It would require wedging local militants from al-Qaeda, integrating Pakistani and Afghan insurgents into their respective political systems, and repairing Pakistan-Afghanistan ties.
Ending the insurgencies might also necessitate replacing U.S. and NATO forces with non-neighboring Muslim states such as Indonesia and Turkey. No occupying power has lasted longer than a decade in modern Afghanistan.
Our relations with Pakistan are at a decisive juncture. The current and next administration and Congress have an opportunity to strike a new deal with this nascent Muslim democracy, nuclear power, and pivotal country in a critical region. We cannot afford to let it pass by.
Arif Rafiq is a policy and communications consultant and editor of the Pakistan Policy Blog (www.pakistanpolicy.com).
Recent Comments